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Abstract
This article is more political than legal. Using the ap-
proaches identified by feminist institutionalism, it fo-
cuses on the interactions between the Canadian Advi-
sory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW) and 
the Canadian government during the constitutional cri-
sis of 1980-1981. How did the gendered institutions of 
the federal government facilitate a narrative that, finally, 
was harmful to the women’s movement in Canada?
Résumé
Cet article est plus politique que juridique. En utilisant 
les approches identifiées par les institutions féministes, 
il se penche sur les interactions entre le Conseil consul-
tatif canadien sur la situation de la femme (CCCSF) et le 
gouvernement du Canada durant la crise constitution-
nelle de 1980-1981. Comment les institutions marquées 
par la différenciation des sexes du gouvernement fédé-
ral ont-elles facilité un récit qui était, en fin de compte, 
nuisible au mouvement féministe au Canada?
Introduction
In 2012, we were among those at a small confer-
ence organized by the Dalhousie Association of Women 
and the Law for the thirtieth anniversary of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). The film 
Constitute! was shown, followed by an impressive panel 
of women who had been involved in the events of 1980-
1981.1 Cake was served, a dance was scheduled for later, 
and the mood was celebratory. And we realized three 
things. First, for the young women present, the topic of 
the day was brand new. Second, a consistent myth or 
story had developed around the relevant events of 1980-
1981. Third, the story was basically Doris Anderson’s as 
initially told by her. These facts were faithfully reflected 
in the film and by the reactions of the audience. The 
same story was told by theatre students who produced 
an almost worshipful play based on Doris Anderson’s 
autobiography (Aschaiek 2014).
Looked at more closely, the Anderson episode 
provides, we have come to believe, an exceptionally 
clear example of how gendered institutions can foster 
a narrative that is both gendered itself and productive 
of conformity to those institutions (Kenny 2014, 679; 
Lowndes 2014, 689). This is the more remarkable in that 
the accepted story of Canadian women’s involvement in 
the adoption of the Constitution in 1980-1981 is com-
monly framed in terms of women’s defiance of the polit-
ical institutions of the day (Kenny 2014, 679, 689).
A great deal has been written on what happened 
in relation to the Canadian Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women (CACSW) in 1980-1981. The biog-
rapher of Yvette Rousseau, the second president of the 
CACSW, gives one of the most succinct statements of 
what we all came to believe occurred: 
[Doris Anderson] was to resign dramatically [avec fracas] 
in 1981, members of the CACSW having approved, con-
trary to her recommendation, a ministerial intervention 
to cancel, for political reasons, a constitutional conference 
convoked by the Council. (O’Neil 2004, 312)2
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Julyan Reid (2007), then CACSW research director, 
provides a more detailed account:
A conference was planned…To our frustration, it was can-
celled by the Minister responsible for the Status of Women 
and the Advisory Council, with the support of the Coun-
cil Vice-Presidents. However, this temporary setback led 
to the organization by women, with the support of Flora 
Macdonald, of an ad-hoc conference on Parliament Hill 
that was so successful that it made history for women 
across Canada. Doris was the mother of this history-mak-
ing assertion of women’s fundamental rights. (59)
Note the tropes: ministerial intervention for 
political reasons, cancelled conference, resignation, 
Ad Hoc conference with huge impact. In fact, there is 
reason to doubt all of these except the dramatic res-
ignation and the Ad Hoc conference itself (as distin-
guished from its influence). Journalist Penney Kome’s 
(1983) laudatory volume is the most accessible and 
influential account we have. In her 1983 book The 
Taking of Twenty-Eight: Women Challenge the Consti-
tution, she described the episode as an “earthquake” 
that proved Canadian women to be “a formidable na-
tional political force, knocking a Cabinet Minister out 
of his status of women portfolio” (23). But even Kome 
provided small hints of a different narrative lurking in 
the background. For instance, she wrote that “Some 
members were unhappy about seeing Council run by 
press release” (20).
There is indeed a different story to tell. This is 
Joanne Linzey (1981) from Whitehorse, a member of 
the CACSW executive in 1981:
Doris Anderson resigned because she had lost the con-
fidence of her executive and the majority of her Coun-
cil. She lost our confidence not over any supposed min-
isterial interference but because she repeatedly failed to 
consult with Council and be responsive to its consen-
sus. (17)
Another commentator, an admirer of the organizers of 
the February 1981 Ad Hoc conference, called them “ka-
mikaze warriors whose admirable morality was worn 
on their sleeves plain for all to see.” Kamikaze warriors, 
she noted, “achieve symbolic victories but do not win 
the war” (Collins 1981, 30). 
A generation later, it is time to look again at 
what happened, the more so as there is new material 
on the CACSW now available. Katie Cooke (2001), the 
first president, wrote a detailed account of the first years 
of the CACSW. There is also the authoritative biogra-
phy of Yvette Rousseau, the second president (O’Neil 
2004). Furthermore, Berenice Sisler (1997), a Manito-
ban appointed to the CACSW in 1980, left a 50-page 
typescript entitled, “The Perpetuation of a Myth: The 
Anderson-Axworthy Affair.”3 Her account began as 
follows: “Someone once said if you told a whopper and 
told it often enough, it would soon be accepted as fact.” 
She continued: “In my opinion, that is exactly what has 
happened with respect to the infamous feud between 
Doris Anderson and [her minister] Lloyd Axworthy” 
(1). 
This is why we feel compelled to reexamine 
what has been described as “a courageous act of dis-
sent” (Landsberg 2011, 266) or the “biggest triumph” 
of the Canadian women’s movement (Anderson 1991, 
221). To begin with, we want to make this new mate-
rial known. Then there is the question of what really 
happened. Truth does matter, however appealing, even 
enabling, our plausible beliefs may be. It makes a differ-
ence what story is told, and it matters even more that 
the story should be not just inspirational, but also accu-
rate. The episode’s role in the government’s influence on 
the women’s movement needs to be recognized.
This thematic cluster consists of articles that 
grew out of a 2012 conference held at Dalhousie Uni-
versity. The articles by Beverley Baines, Penney Kome, 
and Nancy Ruth are based on their presentations. Mary 
Eberts’ article is an entirely new discussion of the devel-
opment of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. It should be noted that the authors do 
not all agree on their interpretation of the 1980-1981 
occurrences around the CACSW and the constitution. 
These disagreements are important. We conclude with 
Berenice Sisler’s previously unpublished account com-
pleted in 1997.
In what follows in this introduction, we discuss 
the following: the story of CACSW President Doris An-
derson; the Canadian women’s movement and the con-
stitutional crisis; the CACSW and its problems; a coun-
terfactual account; implications for feminist practice; 
and insights for theories of feminist institutionalism.
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The Story of CACSW President Doris Anderson
Doris Anderson, best known as the editor of 
the women’s magazine Chatelaine, was appointed pres-
ident of the national Canadian Advisory Council on 
the Status of Women in 1980. She was the third pres-
ident, following Katie Cooke and Yvette Rousseau. 
When she had—very successfully—been in charge 
at Chatelaine (1956-1977), her editorials and general 
policy had been unabashedly and influentially femi-
nist (Korinek 2000, 37). Then, at loose ends, after fail-
ing to become the editor of Maclean-Hunter’s flagship 
Maclean’s magazine, she accepted the invitation to run 
for the Liberals in a risky 1978 by-election (Bennett 
2007, 46). Losing and unwilling to seek the nomina-
tion again,4 she then became one of the many defeated 
candidates to receive a “plum” patronage appointment 
(her description)—in her case, the presidency of the 
CACSW.5 She was already a member of the council 
and had ideas about how to make it more effective; 
she figured that it would take her three years. She did 
not, however, get along with her Minister, Lloyd Ax-
worthy; she recorded disagreement with him prior to 
his appointment (Anderson 1996, 229, 231, 235-237, 
239-241). It is important to remember that Ander-
son was a journalist who had no association with any 
second-wave women’s group until after her CACSW 
presidency when she became president of the Nation-
al Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). 
In 1980-1981, when she presided over the council, her 
relationship with the women’s movement was signifi-
cant, but distant.
The employees at the CACSW adored Anderson 
and columnist Michele Landsberg (2011), who had ear-
lier worked for her on Chatelaine magazine, praised her 
as “a trailblazer for the Canadian feminist revolution to 
come” (263). However, Anderson was accustomed to 
the hierarchical mode of editor of a magazine, while her 
fellow appointees preferred the consensual practices of 
second-wave women’s groups. At issue early in 1981 was 
the timing of the CACSW’s conference on women and 
the constitution planned for February. When Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy suggested a postponement, Anderson 
insisted on holding it on the scheduled date, but the 
council disagreed. Complaining that she had lost con-
trol, Anderson refused to accept the majority decisions 
of the CACSW executive (five to one) and then the en-
tire council (17 to 10) (Collins 1981, 15, 18; Gray 1981, 
28; Linzey 1981). She then resigned extremely publicly 
as she had threatened to do. 
In her autobiography, Anderson (1991) wrote 
that “This situation, my resignation, and the publici-
ty6 around it, enraged Canadian women from coast to 
coast.” She went on to recount how a massive constitu-
tional conference of women was organized in Ottawa 
(on February 14-15, 1981) by a committee of volun-
teers (members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Canadian 
Women on the Constitution, usually referred to as Ad 
Hockers), and section 28 was added to the Charter. “It, 
along with Section 15…is the equivalent of the Equal 
Rights Amendment in the United States which U.S. 
women have been working to get into their constitution 
since 1923.” Later, “premiers tried to put a restraining 
clause on Sec 28. Women from coast to coast rallied 
furiously, and the premiers caved in almost overnight, 
removing the clause” (222).
Most authors still accept Anderson’s interpreta-
tion. The fracas of her resignation and the mobilization 
of women that followed are thus credited with produc-
ing, among other constitutional impacts, a unique and 
significant commitment to equality for women. Unfor-
tunately, this interpretation is, to say the least, mislead-
ing.
The Canadian Women’s Movement and the Constitu-
tional Crisis
On the face of it, it is surprising that the ar-
cane business of constitutional change produced such 
an iconic moment for women in Canada. The stories 
—constitutional history and feminist involvement 
with constitutional change—have both been told many 
times. However, they are usually not combined because 
constitutional accounts see no need to refer to feminist 
activism, while accounts of the women’s movement 
usually give scant attention to contextual constitution-
al efforts. The chart included in Appendix 1 provides a 
basic chronology of relevant events; for 1980 and 1981, 
we have combined what occurred in and around the 
CACSW and the simultaneous and crucial constitu-
tional developments. The successful campaign in 1981 
to exempt the key equality provision (section 28) from 
the constitutional override (section 33) draws the two 
narratives together.7 Both stories really began in 1980.
In the fall of 1980, the CACSW planned a confer-
ence on women and the constitution to be held in Sep-
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tember. It was rescheduled for February 1981 because 
of a translators’ strike in September 1980. On October 
18, Persons Day, NAC held a study day on women and 
the constitution in Toronto. In November 1980, NAC 
and the CACSW were among the women’s groups that 
presented briefs to the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitu-
tion of Canada. The session became notorious among 
feminists after Co-chair Harry Hays dismissed them 
with the condescending comment: “I’m just wondering 
why we don’t have a section in here about babies and 
children. All you girls will be out working and we’re not 
going to have anybody to look after them” (Riley 1981, 
18). Nonetheless, in January 1981, the Minister of Jus-
tice announced that many of the feminist organizations’ 
“excellent” suggestions of wording for the Charter had 
been accepted (Jean Chrétien cited in Canada Parlia-
ment 1981, 13).What then ensued has been discussed 
above: the over-ruling of Doris Anderson’s preferenc-
es by the CACSW, her resignation, and the volunteer 
Ad Hoc group and its conference. In May 1981, the 
CACSW, now under the presidency of Lucie Pépin, held 
its own long-postponed conference.
The immediate context was Canada’s consti-
tutional crisis—so called because national unity was 
feared to hinge on the outcome of negotiations between 
Ottawa and the provinces. Updates to the constitution-
al order had been initiated off and on since the 1950s, 
principally to address the rise of Québec nationalism. 
Pressure intensified when the separatist Parti Québécois 
was elected in 1976 to a majority in Québec’s National 
Assembly under the leadership of René Lévesque and 
when, four years later, the Québec government held a 
provincial referendum on proceeding with negotiations 
for “souveraineté-association.” It was narrowly defeated, 
but Lévesque was still premier in Québec and national 
unity still looked precarious. 
After the referendum, a newly elected Liberal 
government under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau undertook to “patriate” the con-
stitution, that is, to bring the ability to amend it from 
Britain to Canada. In the aftermath of difficult, pro-
tracted, and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations with 
the provinces in September 1980, Trudeau announced 
that the Government of Canada intended—without the 
concurrence of the provinces—to ask the British Parlia-
ment to amend the constitutional order. The premiers 
immediately launched a legal appeal in what became 
the “Constitutional Reference Case.” In September 
1981, the Supreme Court ruled that, although unilateral 
federal patriation was legal, it was contrary to constitu-
tional convention. 
It was in the midst of this stalemate before the 
Supreme Court released its decision that the Govern-
ment of Canada introduced a Charter of Rights and Free-
doms to be entrenched as Part I of what was to become 
the Constitution Act, 1982. In fact, patriation did not 
require that the constitutional package include a Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms; only an amending formula 
was needed. The proposed Charter was part of a “peo-
ple’s package” that the federal government hoped would 
build public support for patriation over the heads of the 
recalcitrant premiers (Stein 1989, 29).
The Charter’s provisions for equality rights 
were central to feminist concerns, especially since the 
1960 Bill of Rights was initially proposed as the model 
for the new one. That document had contained equal-
ity rights, but Canadian judges were reluctant to strike 
down (or declare invalid) legislation that violated those 
rights. As regards individuals, a series of notorious cas-
es underlined the fact that, at most, the Bill of Rights 
required only equal administration of laws.8 The new 
Charter came to contain stronger provisions for equal-
ity rights, applying to all levels of government. It would 
also invite more frequent judicial review of legislation. 
In the meantime, the Ad Hoc conference had devel-
oped section 28. This is when, finally and most crucial-
ly, the two streams of activity (the women’s movement 
and the constitutional crisis) came together. Kome’s 
(1983) title “the taking of twenty-eight” refers to the 
last stage of the process when, over a period of several 
weeks, section 28 was rescued by the efforts of women 
and women’s groups from a possible override by legis-
lative action. 
The CACSW and Its Problems
The Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
(RCSW) seems to have envisaged the CACSW as the 
institution that would realize and then oversee its 167 
recommendations and produce those changes in atti-
tudes and practices that would enable a transformation 
of Canadian society (RCSW 1970, 390). In the years 
following the RCSW Report in 1970, however, no such 
council was established in spite of continuing requests 
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by established women’s groups. In the meantime, at the 
1972 Strategy for Change conference at which NAC was 
established, those who considered themselves to rep-
resent the true women’s movement as it had been re-
vived and renewed since the 1960s actually opposed the 
formation of a governmental status of women council. 
Radical feminists (including New Feminists) as well as 
socialist and Marxist feminists were supported by old 
leftists, such as trade unionist Madeleine Parent. They 
formed a radical caucus whose demands foreshadowed 
fissures that were to reemerge during the constitution-
al crisis (personal communication, Johanna Stuckey 
2013; Macpherson 1994, 153-154; Madeleine Parent 
in Rebick 2005, 29-30; Laurel Ritchie in Rebick 2005, 
30-31, Young 2000, 66). The radicals succeeded in ob-
taining a vote in favour of rejecting any governmental 
advisory council. The coalition group that was emerg-
ing (NAC), which was comprised of radical feminists, 
older groups, and feminist-friendly organizations such 
as unions, nevertheless ultimately backed the concept of 
such a council. Kay Macpherson (1994), later president 
of NAC, put it tactfully: “opinions differed on whether 
these would act as a cushion between the government 
and the pressures from women or whether they could 
serve a useful role in providing research and support for 
women’s needs.” She added: “There have been occasions 
when both these predictions came true” (154).
The large traditional national women’s groups, 
some dating back to the nineteenth century, saw a status 
of women council as a useful ongoing interface between 
the women’s movement—as represented mainly by 
them—and the government. They were used to lobby-
ing government and a forum dedicated to their concerns 
was an attractive notion. NAC picked up this lobbying 
mandate, though always with a certain ambivalence 
about how to relate to government (Vickers, Rankin, 
and Appelle 1993). Marjorie Griffin Cohen, speaking 
about NAC, said in an interview: “We didn’t present 
briefs to parliament thinking we would convince them 
through lobbying; we did it to get press coverage and to 
raise public opinion to force changes” (Cohen in Rebick 
2005, 185-186; Young 2000, 69-71, 76-77).
The debates at the Strategy for Change confer-
ence about a possible council probably did not regis-
ter with anyone inside government. Council President 
Katie Cooke (2001) does not even mention the confer-
ence in her memoir. The initial distrust of a council ex-
pressed at the founding of NAC lay dormant until 1981 
when the events around the constitutional negotiations 
opened the door to a serious challenge to the CACSW. 
In Council President Lucie Pépin’s Annual Report for 
1980-1981, she referred to the events of that period, 
discreetly, as “the widely publicized conflict of January 
1981.” The CACSW recognized that it had been attacked: 
the events of early 1981 had been “used by some to chal-
lenge the very existence of the Council,” wrote Pépin, 
and the council was fighting to “continue to play a vital 
and necessary role in women’s affairs…” (CACSW 1981, 
1).9 Pépin’s few words quoted here are the only available 
public statement about the whole drama of Anderson’s 
resignation and the Ad Hoc conference. Senator Flor-
ence Bird (1981), who had chaired the Royal Commis-
sion on the Status of Women and also addressed the 
February 16, 1981 meeting of fourteen women’s groups 
to discuss the CACSW, referred diplomatically to “what 
has happened recently,” when spelling out new criteria 
for the council’s president (6).
The establishment of a women’s council was by 
no means unique. What the RCSW had recommend-
ed was the creation of an advisory council on the same 
lines as the Canada Council for the Arts, the Science 
Council of Canada, or the Economic Council of Can-
ada, all of which were mandated to conduct research, 
be in contact with organizations, and report directly to 
Parliament (RCSW 1970, 390).10 Most of the provinces 
created status of women councils, which nearly all dis-
appeared during the 1990s, although a variety of other 
councils, often very specialized and usually connected 
to a particular industry, continue to operate.11 The sta-
tus of women councils most resembled other 1970s-era 
vehicles for consultation with broad and diffuse social 
movements, such as those representing youth, Indige-
nous peoples, or ethnocultural groups; these councils 
have likewise been disbanded (Pal 1995). 
The basic purpose of an advisory council is to 
provide expert, nonpartisan advice that is more disin-
terested than advice from a lobby or think tank. Issues 
of institutional autonomy are endemic for these coun-
cils. Jonathan Malloy’s (2003) work on status of women 
councils in Canada and Australia vividly captured such 
contradictions in the metaphor of “colliding worlds,” 
collisions that he perceived, more positively than most 
observers, as opportunities to bridge the gap between 
social movements and governments. A skilled and ex-
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perienced public servant could maneuver their way 
through these collisions, but, with the exception of the 
first president, the CACSW rarely benefitted from that 
level of expertise. In addition, the horizontal breadth 
of the council’s mandate—to address the “status of 
women” across the entirety of public policy—reduced 
its effectiveness because it did not fit into the compart-
mentalized silos of the federal bureaucracy (Burt 1998, 
135-160).
Sandra Burt (1998) considered the CACSW in 
the context of public administration and identified a 
fundamental misunderstanding at the core of its spe-
cific mission. To begin with, the council was necessar-
ily subordinate to the government of the day and the 
Minister responsible. However, was the council also 
the voice and vehicle of the women’s movement inside 
government (135)? Katie Cooke (2001) reported a fate-
ful, if understandable, mistake made at the very begin-
ning: “The SWC coordinator decided that the Minister 
should ask women’s groups and organizations (about 
400) to submit names of women they believed would 
be effective council members” (72). Going to women’s 
groups about appointments sent the wrong message 
from the outset. The groups were bound to be disap-
pointed, even outraged, when subsequent appoint-
ments moved farther away from that initial corporatist 
form of representation. Cooke wrote about “the dangers 
of letting CACSW usurp the role of voluntary women’s 
organisations.” She went on to stress that, in order to 
be effective, the CACSW depended on “pressure from 
women’s groups.” The CACSW, for its part, could pro-
vide information and research, and act as “a watchdog 
at exposed federal heels” (86).
In 1973, when Cooke was put in charge of the 
newborn council, she was one of the most senior wom-
en working in the public service. However, the CACSW 
was a very junior and not very powerful part of the 
government. Cooke (2001) noted in her memoir that, 
“in hierarchical organizations, which the public ser-
vice epitomizes, criticism cannot trickle upwards” (66). 
She herself could have more influence. However, as she 
warned, “trying to build strength on the basis of indi-
viduals occupying positions in the bureaucracy is like 
erecting sand castles whose foundations erode with the 
next tide” (67). Further, Status of Women was always a 
junior portfolio tacked onto a major portfolio and so 
could never be expected to occupy much of a minister’s 
attention. Inside the government, the Office of the Co-
ordinator of Status of Women (as well as the Women’s 
Program of the Department of the Secretary of State) 
competed for influence. In 1977, Marc Lalonde, then 
Minister Responsible for Status of Women, spelled out 
the respective roles of the council and the coordina-
tor in a letter to Yvette Rousseau, then president of the 
council: 
[They are] complementary … you make recommenda-
tions, the government, through the Office of the Coordi-
nator, sees to carrying them out. You both have a role in 
regards to public opinion, the Council to alert [the public] 
to the existence of problems, the Office to say what the 
government has done or plans to do. (O’Neil 2004, 278; 
our translation)
In the 1970s and 1980s, the CACSW’s standard 
conflicts were aggravated by problems growing out of 
the policies of bilingualism. This was the case from the 
very beginning. The first executive committee found it 
necessary to use an interpreter at all meetings so that the 
two vice-presidents could communicate with each oth-
er: June Menzies spoke no French and Yvette Rousseau 
little English (Cooke 2001, 81; O’Neil 2004, 237). The 
timing of the women’s constitutional conference was af-
fected, first of all, by the requirement to have translators 
present. Not surprisingly, some commentators from 
outside Ottawa interpreted the delay as a government 
ploy (Kome 1983, 29).
A Counterfactual Account
We should start by thinking about how memo-
ry works. When Penney Kome wrote her book in 1983, 
the events of two years earlier were fresh in the minds 
of those who experienced them. In Kome’s book, as in 
Michele Landsberg’s columns, we can see those events 
beginning to be shaped into a coherent account, one 
of the stories used to organize our experience, wheth-
er collectively or individually (Lowndes 2014, 689). 
When Alexandra Dobrowolsky (2000) wrote her thesis 
in 1991, she produced the best account available of the 
events of 1980-1981. However, the stories had already 
solidified and the grand heroic narrative was in place. 
This is when Berenice Sisler (1997) wrote her account. 
Nowadays, in the second decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, it is a full generation since the events. Some of the 
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participants are no longer alive (most notably Doris 
Anderson), but, for the rest of them, the remembered 
events will have been patterned so as to make sense ei-
ther in agreement with or in opposition to the master 
story. It is no use asking them about their motives then 
or even their acts. Diaries or journals would be helpful 
if we were engaged in deep research. At this point, how-
ever, we are merely seeking an adequately documented 
alternative to the standard Doris Anderson story. 
Truth matters. Understanding the past also helps 
us to deal with the present. Otherwise, the story of a 
small, brave group of independent feminists who came 
out of nowhere to challenge the government might re-
main an inspiration regardless of its veracity. 
The standard account of the “taking of twen-
ty-eight” has, by now, settled into what looks like his-
torical fact. However, in the course of returning to doc-
uments written at the time, we became aware of another 
perspective that has been neglected and shunted aside. 
We want to modify the accepted interpretation, without 
denigrating Doris Anderson’s willingness to sacrifice 
her job when she could not make the CACSW into the 
sort of institution she felt the women’s movement need-
ed (Anderson in Rebick 2005, 145). 
In fact, another perspective, one that disrupts 
the standard narrative, emerged from these historical 
events. Let us begin by asking: was the “taking of twen-
ty-eight” really the earthquake that it was believed it to 
be? There are certainly reasons to doubt this interpre-
tation, beginning with Lloyd Axworthy’s long and suc-
cessful career, hardly what one would expect of a poli-
tician who was “knocked…out of his portfolio” (Kome 
1983, 23). Let us look at the ongoing activities of the 
feminist lawyers, which hint at a parallel process, partly 
submerged but influential. The lawyers’ tale begins ear-
lier than the winter of 1981. Queen’s University law pro-
fessor Beverley Baines and lawyer Mary Eberts had, in-
dependently, written to the CACSW in 1980 to express 
concerns about the wording of the proposed section 15. 
Weakly labelled “Non-Discrimination,” it was modelled 
closely on the Bill of Rights that women had found so 
disappointing (Dobrowolsky 2000, 45). The lawyers 
recognized the potential to insert women’s rights into 
the constitutional proposals and they wanted to use the 
CACSW as a vehicle for those ideas.
The offer of Baines and Eberts’ services was 
gratefully accepted. They prepared both background pa-
pers and the influential CACSW brief. In addition, they 
contributed to the numerous publications produced on 
the subject. After the February 1981 conference, the 
lawyers and some of the other Ad Hockers continued 
lobbying and working closely with the Department of 
Justice. 
Events must be considered in the context of 
their time. Feminist activism often seems to be cut off 
from the rest of the world. For participants, what they 
are doing matters more than anything else. In fact, it 
was not just equality rights that were important, but also 
some premiers’ efforts, led by Alberta’s Peter Lougheed, 
to secure stronger provincial jurisdiction over natural 
resources (Peckford 2012, 174; Stein 1989, 29, 38-39). 
National unity was also at stake. Québec voters had 
only very narrowly defeated the 1980 referendum on 
proceeding towards sovereignty and the possibility of 
separation was still front and centre. By this time, west-
ern separatists were also stirring. It seemed possible to 
many, including the premiers, that the country was on 
the point of coming apart, starting with either Alberta 
or Québec (Peckford 2012).
Fair enough. Feminism rarely takes centre stage 
in national events. To explore the implications of the 
standard women’s movement narrative further, let us 
speculate about an alternative course of events that 
might have happened. That is, let us think about how 
women’s efforts to influence the new constitution might 
have happened in another, parallel universe. This alter-
nate narrative presents what actually would—should—
have happened in the regular course of events from 
1980 forward, absent Doris Anderson’s CACSW pres-
idency, her managerial style, and her animosity toward 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy.
The issues that emerged around the timing and 
location of the conference influenced the outcome only 
insofar as Anderson’s perception of pressure prompt-
ed her resignation. Minister Axworthy’s suggestion to 
delay the CACSW’s conference until after debate on 
the Charter was completed in the House of Commons 
seems sensible for a number of reasons. It was already 
clear that the normal parliamentary channels would 
produce a better version of section 15 (it was on January 
12 that Justice Minister Chrétien produced new word-
ing) and MPs sympathetic to its concerns were ready to 
follow up on them. This was before Anderson resigned. 
In addition, by that time, it was also obvious that other 
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aspects of the proposed constitution would affect wom-
en. The Ad Hoc conference produced a substantial list of 
recommendations that echoed NAC’s brief of Novem-
ber 1980, and CASCW’s conference in May 1981 was to 
produce more than a dozen (Dobrowolsky 2000, 236). 
Without the distraction of Anderson’s resignation and 
the Ad Hoc conference, parliamentarians could have at-
tended regional conferences looking at such concerns. 
More media coverage would have been available with-
out the need to compete for attention with the action in 
Parliament. 
So far as equality rights were concerned, there 
is evidence that the federal government was prepared 
to proceed with them even before 1981. Michael Stein 
(1989) interviewed a senior official in the Federal-Pro-
vincial Relations Office who told him that the process 
of drafting the Charter in 1980 was more political than 
legal. Negotiations occurred in cabinet, in response to 
the strong and expert lobbying by representatives of 
concerned groups—including women. It was reported 
as follows: 
Somebody said ‘Look, we have to protect the anglophone 
minority in Quebec’…Then somebody said, ‘Look, we 
have to put in something on women’s rights.’ And sudden-
ly you had politicians saying, ‘Who are the special interest 
groups or segments of society in my area that I can put in, 
and therefore get their support for this?’ And that is how 
the Charter was constructed, in a four-hour cabinet meet-
ing in September [1980]. (64)
Going back farther, the Liberal Party was ac-
tively lobbied from the inside on the issue of women’s 
rights. From 1972 onward, feminist MPs in the Lib-
eral caucus raised awareness about the limitations of 
the Bill of Rights and pushed for the enactment of the 
RSCW’s recommendations. These included Monique 
Bégin, who had been research director for the RCSW, 
former municipal councilors Ursula Appollonyi and 
Albanie Morin, and, beginning in 1974, Aideen Nichol-
son of the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women 
(OCSW). Also active in urging cabinet ministers and 
public servants to enact the RCSW’s recommendation 
were Irma Melville, a member of the OCSW and chair 
of the Women’s Liberal Commission, as well as future 
senator Lorna Marsden who was also a member of the 
OCSW, and Liberal Party Policy Chair (1975) and Vice 
President (1980). CACSW Chair Katie Cooke (2001) 
reported that women in the extra-parliamentary wing 
of the Liberal Party dressed in black at a convention 
held at the Chateau Laurier to mourn the Party’s lack 
of action on the Royal Commission’s recommendations. 
Joan Wallace, who would shortly be appointed to the 
CACSW, was a leader in this demonstration (71; Young 
2000, 153, 158).
In the context of the alternative story, the ap-
pearance of feminist lawyers and activists at the Special 
Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Com-
mons on the Constitution may have, in part, served as 
political theatre. The melodrama sparked by Senator 
Harry Hays’ quip about taking care of babies dramatized 
the urgency of entrenching equality rights to protect 
women. Co-chair Serge Joyal, however, recalled that the 
Joint Committee immediately recognized Senator Hays’ 
comment as a mistake. At the twentieth anniversary of 
the hearings, Joyal (2005) described the episode as fol-
lows:
…my co-chair Harry Hays realised that something had 
changed. He was not mastering all the language to express 
that, but he was of such a good heart…when the women’s 
groups finished testifying [and] he thanked them… It cre-
ated a furor among the women. I had to jump in to tell the 
women we had respect for their dignity. There was a feel-
ing that the way we had treated women—in a patronizing, 
patriarchal way—was over. I tell you frankly, the mishap 
of Senator Hays helped us to understand that we could not 
go back.12
Something had already shifted in the distribution of 
power and respect.
On the other side of the partisan fences, the Pro-
gressive Conservatives (PC) and the New Democrats 
(NDP) were more engaged than is usually remembered. 
Both parties were opposed to an entrenched Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, principally on the democratic 
grounds of preserving parliamentary supremacy. Their 
position was supported by provincial legislatures. The 
mobilization of the women’s movement was one more 
item in the opposition parties’ toolkit. Even if the fem-
inist lawyers’ briefs implied entrenchment, the gov-
ernment, and particularly Minister Axworthy, could 
conveniently be attacked for inappropriate interference 
with the CACSW. 
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There is no doubt that the Ad Hoc group was 
a spontaneous and multi-partisan organization of vol-
unteers. However, those volunteers could not have 
succeeded without the assistance of NDPers and Pro-
gressive Conservatives in Parliament. PC MPs Flora 
MacDonald and Walter McLean took a lead role in fa-
cilitating the Ad Hoc conference, assisted by NDP MPs 
Pauline Jewett and Margaret Mitchell. All accounts refer 
to their support on the floor of the House of Commons 
for Anderson’s resignation and her allegations of min-
isterial interference and partisan decisions in the coun-
cil. Few realize, however, the extent of their support. 
In retrospect, aspects of the Ad Hoc conference are 
surprising. It was held in the West Block of the Parlia-
ment Buildings at the request of parliamentarians and 
with the approval of the Speaker. MPs turned over their 
franking privileges to the Ad Hockers so that they could 
send mail at the government’s expense. More extraor-
dinary yet, they allowed organizers to use their phone 
lines for long-distance calls, very expensive at that time, 
even after office hours and well into the night for the 
difficult west coast contacts. The second day of the 
conference was held in Ottawa’s City Hall, provided by 
Mayor Marion Dewar, known to be an NDP partisan. 
None of these actions were routine or really legitimate. 
MPs and civil servants were, in effect, turning over gov-
ernment resources to civil society opposition groups 
(Anderson 1996, 244; Dobrowolsky 2000, 53, 119, 233). 
The regular, institutionalized route for such groups was 
to appear at the hearings of the Joint Committee, which 
the women’s organizations also did. 
In the alternative narrative that we are positing, 
the equality rights provisions in the Charter never be-
came a partisan issue. Anderson never had a confron-
tation with her Minister, she did not resign, and she 
agreed to a series of regional conferences in the spring. 
The Ad Hoc conference did not happen. Without the 
Ad Hoc conference, there would almost certainly have 
been no section 28. Furthermore, even had there had 
been a section 28, possibly developed by feminist law-
yers working with the Justice Department, there would 
have been no post-conference group of feminist activ-
ists, energized by Anderson’s resignation and the Ad 
Hoc conference and ready to mobilize at the provincial 
level to defend section 28 from the override clause. 
Here, we arrive at the important question for 
our counterfactual argument: would the absence of sec-
tion 28 have mattered? It seems not. According to legal 
scholars, we would be exactly where we are now because 
the courts have preferred to use section 15 equality 
rights in their decisions. Donna Greschner (2005) has 
argued that the courts have been averse to using sec-
tion 28 precisely because it is potentially so powerful in 
positioning male / female equality above all other con-
siderations. In her view, the courts prefer section 15 be-
cause it is more amenable to balancing the complicated 
ways that gender, religious, ethnic, and other forms of 
discrimination intersect. As a result, section 28 is well 
on its way to becoming obsolete like the federal powers 
of disallowance or paramountcy (Froc 2014). 
Finally, according to this counterfactual account, 
the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) 
might well have developed much as it did. The CACSW 
had commissioned a study into the use of litigation to 
protect and expand rights. Though it was first present-
ed at the council’s May 1981 conference, the study was 
independent of plans for conferences. In 1985, the year 
when section 15 of the Charter was fully implement-
ed and LEAF was founded, the government expanded 
the Court Challenges Program (initially restricted to 
official language minority rights) to include section 15 
equality rights cases.13 As a result, LEAF became eligible 
to receive funding under that program when the equal-
ity provisions were extant. 
Implications for Feminist Practice
So far, in this counterfactual account, we arrive 
at the same endpoint as in the real world. This is an 
important conclusion: that the women’s constitution-
al crisis had no significant impact in terms of consti-
tutional outcomes or jurisprudence. What we have is, 
in effect, a null finding. However, such a counterfactual 
argument needs a more compelling outcome; that is, we 
are looking for a reason—if a speculative one—to prefer 
one course of history over another. This is not an easy 
choice with high drama possibly yielding to everyday 
incrementalism. But it may well be that the counter-
factual scenario does highlight what was lost when the 
conventional narrative became entrenched as the femi-
nist account. There is no direct evidence here, but per-
haps the following speculations may be useful —if only 
to provide suggestions for feminist research agendas. 
To begin with, it seems likely that Anderson did 
do damage through her interactions with her Minis-
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ter. She insulted Lloyd Axworthy, who had specifically 
asked for Status of Women to go with his first portfolio, 
Employment and Immigration. For example, Ander-
son went directly to Prime Minister Trudeau with her 
plans for the women’s constitutional conference, noti-
fying her Minister only through correspondence sent 
to all MPs; he was mortified (Kome 1983, 29). Senior 
Liberal MP Carolyn Bennett (2007) reported “consid-
erable antipathy” inside the Liberal Party towards An-
derson who was never forgiven for her confrontation 
with Axworthy (42-54). As we noted above, Axworthy 
went on to complete a long and successful career in the 
public service so Anderson had no noticeable impact 
on his professional life. However, the responsibility for 
Status of Women was handed over to increasingly ju-
nior ministers and ministers of state.
It also seems likely that Anderson’s comments 
and overall recklessness injured the prospects for 
women to be appointed to the CACSW. Anderson re-
peatedly maligned the council as a group of patronage 
appointees who toadied to the Minister. In a 1997 in-
terview, for example, she stated that “government [was] 
appointing political hacks to the council” (Anderson in 
Rebick 2005, 144-145). Those so-called “political hacks” 
appointed during her presidency included labour her-
oine Huguette Plamondon who had been national 
vice-president of the NDP.14 Furthermore, Anderson 
was insensitive to the regional dimension of council 
appointments; she failed to appreciate that these wom-
en were local notables in their own cities even if they 
did not figure in a NAC-centred version of the women’s 
movement. Many such local worthies were appointed 
while she was president. A good number were also in-
volved in the women’s movement, such as, for exam-
ple, Irene Chabot (Fournier), leader of French-speak-
ing women in Saskatchewan and other françaises hors 
Québec, and Elizabeth Batstone, director of Cultural 
Affairs in Newfoundland and prominent in the (volun-
teer) status of women councils there.15 Joanne Linzey, 
cited above, was a 30-year volunteer and co-founder 
and manager of the public transit that served primar-
ily women in Whitehorse.16 Anderson’s remarks had 
the effect of denigrating women’s appointment to the 
CACSW and indeed to the government more general-
ly, just when women were beginning to be appointed 
to government boards and commissions (Champagne 
1980).
The narrative of the “taking of twenty-eight” also 
had consequences outside government. In retrospect, it 
becomes apparent how little some of the main players 
in the constitutional crisis actually cared for institu-
tional politics. Claiming that women succeeded only 
through NAC and, in its absence, the Ad Hockers, the 
embedded narrative helped to set the women’s move-
ment, for the next thirty years, on a path characterized 
by outsider tactics of activism, protest, and criticism. 
Since the intervention in 1981 was believed to have 
been successful, the experience prompted other similar 
interventions. Those outsider tactics would not always 
prove to be productive in the long run. By the last years 
of the twentieth century, much of Canadian feminism 
was firmly on the anti-government, anti-party, and an-
ti-institutionalist side of the fence. Ottawa public ser-
vice insiders Maureen O’Neil and Sharon Sutherland 
(1997) lamented that the women’s movement did not 
seek out insiders as allies in a project of “intelligent in-
crementalism.” Looking from inside the machinery of 
government, they observed: “The instant psychic relief 
gained by the whistlers and shouters is not matched 
by projects in substantive policy to benefit all women. 
That open confrontation…sustained the attack by the 
Tory right wing” during the Mulroney years (217). At 
the federal level, only LEAF proved effective during the 
long drought of the next generation, making good use 
of the Court Challenges Program that was in place until 
2007 (Manfredi 2004). As for NAC, soon after the turn 
of the century, it had pretty much ceased to exist (Cuth-
bert Brandt et al. 2011, 588).
Public activists have monopolized the story 
of the entrenchment of women’s equality rights in the 
Canadian constitution for too long. We propose an al-
ternative account in which politicians and lawyers get 
more credit. In our counterfactual argument, Anderson 
becomes less important. Instead, we want to highlight 
the role of Minister Axworthy in relation to the work 
of the CACSW. After a tactless speech at NAC’s study 
day on the constitution on October 18, 1980, Axwor-
thy became the object of scorn and hostility by the Ad 
Hockers and their supporters. The February conference 
ended with a call for his resignation and journalists cov-
ered him with opprobrium. But as far as we can tell, Ax-
worthy seems to have initiated CACSW involvement in 
the constitutional project quite early, sometime in 1980, 
and then supported it (Kome 1983, 28). The charge of 
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interference to cancel a conference seems unjustified; 
as we have noted, the conference was, in fact, simply 
postponed and took place in May 1981. Nor, it seems, 
did Axworthy insist on regional conferences on women 
and the constitution (which was, it should be noted, a 
project of NAC’s in 1980) (Young 2000, 156). According 
to executive member Joanne Linzey (1981), Axworthy’s 
last comment after meeting with the CACSW executive, 
including its president, was the following: “It is your 
decision, it is your conference. I can live with it either 
way.”17
In 1981, a dramatic resignation and successful 
ad hoc volunteerism “created a story to tell, a feminist 
fable about power: how 1,300 women went to Otta-
wa to slay a dragon, defend a heroine and influence 
the course of history” (Collins 1981, 30). Very inspir-
ing, except that, as we have attempted to show, it was 
not quite what happened. The byzantine complexities 
of Ottawa’s (gendered) bureaucracies defeated Ander-
son as they had her predecessor, trade unionist Yvette 
Rousseau (O’Neil 2004, 262, 278-279; Anderson 1996, 
230, 235-236, 247). 
Finally, we want to underline another dimen-
sion of Anderson’s feminism that was, unfortunately, 
eclipsed by the drama of resignation and protest: her 
support of women’s entry into electoral politics (An-
derson, 1996, 221-225). Her obituary quoted former 
MP and Minister Flora MacDonald as saying: “She 
[Anderson] would keep an eye out for people whom 
she thought might be encouraged to get into the po-
litical arena” (Martin 2007). A famous issue of Chat-
elaine featured 104 women who would make good 
MPs (Frum 1971). MacDonald was one of them; she 
went from working in the Progressive Conservative 
Party’s national office to being elected MP in 1972 
and appointed Minister in 1979, holding her seat until 
1988. In 1972, this article helped to produce the group 
Women for Political Action, which in turn was be-
hind the Committee for ‘94 (1984) and, in 2001, Equal 
Voice—all dedicated to getting more women into deci-
sion-making positions (Young 2000, 59, 60-61, 68). In 
her old age, Anderson turned for a while to advocating 
proportional representation as a panacea. She appar-
ently came to recognize that electoral reform would be 
inadequate. So when she died in 2007, her will left a 
substantial endowment to Equal Voice for its role in 
getting more women elected.
Insights for Theories of Feminist Institutionalism
This case study of Canadian constitutional 
history underscores and confirms the importance of 
institutional analysis—feminist institutionalism—to 
achieve an accurate understanding of the complex leg-
islative and constitutional events that are all too easily 
overshadowed by the media controversies of the day.
The account presented here speaks to ongoing 
debates in feminist institutionalism. Vivien Lowndes 
(2014) provides three questions to structure an inves-
tigation. First, how do institutions formally regulate 
behaviour to produce gendered effects? In the case of 
the history of equality rights in the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, legal scholars have ably docu-
mented the impact of legal institutions on the practice 
of gender. 
Second, analysts need to address how “the gen-
dered logic of appropriateness” directs informal be-
haviour inside institutions (Chappell in Lowndes 2014, 
689). In this Atlantis thematic cluster, Berenice Sisler’s 
(1997) account of the conflicts around the boardroom 
tables in Ottawa brings to life the nuances of what was 
considered appropriate behaviour for women exercis-
ing power in the early 1980s. Certainly, there was lit-
tle latitude for Doris Anderson’s larger-than-life media 
personality in the hallways of power. But we also need 
to examine what is and is not gendered with respect to 
institutionalized deference to Ministers of the Crown.
Lowndes’ third question is the one most germane 
to our purposes. She asks: how do institutions construct 
stories that direct political behaviour down one partic-
ular pathway or another? Canadians have constructed 
a deeply gendered narrative about how equality rights 
were achieved. In a bizarre mirror image of each other, 
both critical and sympathetic accounts collude in a sin-
gle misleading interpretation. On the one hand, a crit-
ical account sees Anderson and the Ad Hockers acting 
out traditional female histrionics, giving evidence that 
women—as candidates, patronage appointees, or lobby-
ists—cannot be trusted to exercise power according to 
the conventions of parliamentary governance. On the 
other hand, a sympathetic account sees radical feminist 
activism challenging hegemonic masculinity. Neither 
account is accurate; both supply misleading lessons for 
praxis. Careful attention to the interplay between for-
mal and informal institutional structures and their gen-
dered effects casts doubt on both accounts.
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In conclusion, this paper has presented new evi-
dence about stories of how women’s equality rights came 
to be included in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
during Canada’s constitutional crisis of 1980 and 1981. 
For both feminists and their opponents, a consistent 
myth has become entrenched—that women activists, 
as political outsiders, compelled a hostile government 
to act. The dramatic climax is the story of how Doris 
Anderson, in her capacity as president of the Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, confronted 
her Minister. From this episode, Canadian women’s or-
ganizations drew the lesson that confrontation was the 
most appropriate tactic. 
In order to assess the impact of insider and out-
sider strategies, we developed a counterfactual analysis 
of what would have happened without the dramatic 
standoff. In general, feminist institutionalism directed 
us to the role of institutional structures in the pursuit 
of gender equality. For both good and bad, such efforts 
in Canada are nested in the structures, norms, and cul-
tures of a Westminster parliamentary system (Mackay 
2014). As a result, as this article shows, senior women 
bureaucrats and party insiders were more influential 
than was previously thought.
To quote Ad Hocker Marilou McPhedran’s re-
flection after the rescue of section 28 from the override: 
“To make any lasting change you have to participate in 
the workings of an institution, and that’s what we didn’t 
do” (Collins 1981, 30). Nor did they understand how to 
do it.
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Endnotes
1 The film Constitute! was produced by the International Women’s 
Rights Project, directed by Susan Brazilli and Robert Rooney. It is 
available at http://constitute.ca/the-film/ and includes interviews 
with Ad Hockers Linda Ryan Nye and Pat Hacker as well as Doris 
Anderson.
2 Our translation of “Elle démissionera avec fracas en 1981, des 
membres du CSF ayant approuvé à l’encontre de son avis, une inter-
vention ministérielle dans le but d’annuler, pour des raisons poli-
tiques, une conférence constitutionnelle convoquée par le Conseil.”
3 We thank University of Manitoba archivist Dr. Shelley Sweeney 
as well as Lewis St George Stubbs for assistance in identifying and 
copying this manuscript housed in the Berenice Sisler Fonds, Box 
8.
4 Roland de Corneille easily held the riding for the Liberals until 
1998.
5 Doris Anderson (1991) said this repeatedly of CACSW appoin-
tees, exempting herself of the implied partisan subservience (21).
6 The following terms related to Canada’s constitution appeared 
in the headlines and lead paragraphs of articles published in The 
Globe & Mail / Canadian Press from the beginning of 1980 until 
the end of 1982: Pierre Trudeau 2239; constitution or constitution-
al 2732; Charter of Rights 291; René Lévesque 548; Western sepa-
ratism 32; Doris Anderson 31.
7 Section 28: “Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights 
and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons.” Section 33: “(1) Parliament or the legislature of a 
province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the 
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or 
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.”
8 For example, Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell (1974) on 
women’s rights to Indian status under the Indian Act; Murdoch 
v. Murdoch (1975) on matrimonial property; and Bliss v Attorney 
General of Canada (1979) on pregnant women’s (non) entitlement 
to unemployment insurance benefits during pregnancy. All these 
cases are available on-line at the Canadian Legal Information Insti-
tute operated by the Law Societies of Canada. https://www.canlii.
org/en/ca/
9 Doris Anderson signed off as CACSW president in March 1978 
and March 1979. Lucie Pépin signed off for 1980-1981 in March 
1981. Anderson’s presidency has vanished from the official records 
of the council as has her membership on the council in 1980-1981; 
they are traceable only in the Canada Gazette.
10 The Canada Council for the Arts has operated since 1957. The 
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Science Council operated from 1966 to 1993. As a crown corpo-
ration, the Economic Council of Canada had more autonomy and 
reported directly to the prime minister; it operated from 1963 to 
1993.
11 For example, the National Orphaned / Abandoned Mines Ad-
visory Committee or the Commercial Salmon Advisory Board. 
Nova Scotia and Québec still have advisory councils on the status 
of women.
12 Interview with Senator Serge Joyal on the 20th Anniversary of 
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Febru-
ary 2005. http://sen.parl.gc.ca/sjoyal/June%202005/Section15Cel-
ebrationArticle.html
13 Funding for the Court Challenges Program for section 15 equal-
ity rights operated from 1985 to 1992 and then again from 1994 to 
2006. Language rights continue to be funded separately. 
14 Huguette Plamondon. 1980. Canada Gazette, September 5: 542. 
http://nupge.ca/content/3922/remembering-labour-pioneer-hu-
guette-plamondon labour.
15 Irene Chabot-Fournier: http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/chabot_
irene_1930.html; http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia. com/en/
article/newfoundland-division-of-cultural-affairs-emc/; Elizabeth 
Batstone:http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/
newfoundland-division-of-cultural-affairs-emc/;http://www.
teachaboutwomen.ca/view_html.php?docID=142&type=1
16 Joanne Linzey: http://www.theharwoodinstitute.org/about/peo-
ple/joanne-linzey/;http://www.horizonscda.ca/pdf/linzeyresume.
pdf
17 This meeting, held on January 8, 1981, is the focus of one of the 
key disagreements about the events around the CACSW in ear-
ly 1981. Who arranged it? Who, in particular, was responsible for 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s presence? What did he say? There is a 
partial, leaked transcript of the meeting of the executive commit-
tee, members of which sued for defamation (Landsberg cited in 
Rebick 2005, 266-267; Linzey 1981).
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Chronology of Events
The Women’s Movement Main Constitutional Process
Date Action Date Action
26 August 1978
Doris Anderson appointed to Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women 
(CACSW).
12 May 1979 Doris Anderson appointed president of CACSW.
22 May 1979 Joe Clark’s Progressive Conservative government elected.
13 December 
1979
Joe Clark’s Progressive Conservative government 
defeated in the House.
18 February 
1980
Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government elected: 
Jean Chrétien, Justice Minister; Lloyd Axworthy, 
Minister responsible for Status of Women. 
20 May 1980
Québec referendum to begin negotiations for 
sovereignty-association defeated. Premier 
René Lévesque continues with Parti Québécois 
government.
August 1980
CACSW announces a conference on women 
and the constitution to be held on September 
5-6. 
30 August 1980 Leak of controversial “Kirby memorandum.” 
2 September 
1980
Conference postponed in solidarity with 
striking translators.
8-12 September 
1980
Prime Minister and premiers meet in 
negotiations; they fail to agree on a constitutional 
package.
2 October 1980
Justice Minister Chrétien releases a proposed 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including a 
“Non-discrimination” clause that is essentially 
the 1960 Bill of Rights.
12 October 
1980
Prime Minister Trudeau announces that he 
intends to make a unilateral request to the 
British Parliament to amend the constitution, 
without the premiers’ agreement. 
18 October 
1980
National Action Committee on the Status of 
Women (NAC) Annual Meeting in Toronto; 
Lloyd Axworthy featured speaker.
 23 October 
1980 
Parliament establishes a Special Joint Committee 
to hold public hearings on the Constitution 
of Canada. Chairs: Senator Harry Hays and 
Liberal Member Serge Joyal. 
Appendix 1
Date Action Date Action
20 November 
1980
CACSW and NAC present briefs to Hays-Joyal 
Joint Committee on the Constitution.
December 
1980
CACSW announces a conference to be held 
13-14 February 1981.
First week of 
January 1981
Minister Axworthy indicates a preference for a 
series of regional conferences on women and 
the constitution.
9 January 1981 CACSW executive votes to postpone the national conference planned for February.
12 January 
1981
Doris Anderson issues a press release 
announcing a national conference over the 
objections of CACSW executive.
12 January 
1981
Justice Minister Jean Chrétien announces major 
revisions to equality rights and commends the 
work of women’s organizations
20 January 
1981
Full CACSW meeting votes 17 to 10 in favour 
of postponing conference.
20 January 
1981
Doris Anderson resigns as president of 
CACSW.
21 January 
1981 CACSW announces conference for May 1981.
27 January 
1981
Ad Hoc Committee on Women and the 
Constitution formed in Toronto to plan a 
conference on women and the constitution.
14-15 February 
1981
Ad Hoc “Butterfly” conference on women and 
the constitution.
13 February 
1981
Report of the Joint Committee on the Constitution 
tabled in Parliament. 
17 February 
1981
PC MP Flora MacDonald brings the Ad Hoc 
resolutions to House of Commons. 
1 March 1981 Lucie Pépin appointed president of CACSW.
April 1981
Feminist lawyers meet with Department of 
Justice to formulate an overriding statement of 
equality, section 28.
13 April 1981 Premier René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois government re-elected in Québec. 
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Date Action Date Action
23 April 1981 Section 28 approved by House of Commons. 
29-30 May 
1981
CACSW conference: “Women and the 
constitution: The next five years.”
5 June 1981 Prime Minister and premiers meet to negotiate. No agreement reached.
28 September 
1981
Supreme Court rules that unilateral federal 
patriation is legal but contrary to constitutional 
convention.
4 November 
1981
Prime Minister and premiers reach a compromise 
with section 33, the “notwithstanding clause.”  
November  
1981
Women’s groups denounce Section 33’s 
application to the equality provisions. A two-
week campaign persuades the premiers to 
exempt section 28 from the notwithstanding 
clause. 
25 November 
1981
Justice Minister Chrétien announces that section 
28 will stand free of section 33 override.
5 November 
1981
Parliament tables a constitutional accord signed 
by the Government of Canada and all provincial 
governments except Québec. 
17 April 1982 Constitution Act, 1982 proclaimed in force by Queen Elizabeth in Ottawa.
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